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IRS ACCESS TO BANK RECORDS; PROPOSED
MODIFICATIONS IN ADMINISTRATIVE
SUBPOENA PROCEDURE
Banks serve the public in many capacities, the most common being
as depository, lender, and trustee. A wealth of personal information
not limited to financial data is contained in bank records. Indeed, "the
banking transactions of an individual give a fairly accurate account of
his religion, ideology, opinions, and interests."1 Government investiga-
tors have long recognized the utility of bank records in conducting in-
vestigations.2 They have been assisted in this regard by federal legis-
lation which requires banks to copy and retain vast amounts of
information, specifically for the purpose of government inquiry.3 Ad-
ministrative agencies at federal, state, and local levels can obtain access
to this information through the use of administrative subpoenas.4 "
1. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 85 (1974) (Douglas, J.,
dissenting).
2. Government investigators have strongly emphasized their need for bank infor-
mation. See Hearings on S. 2200 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the
Comm. on Banking, Housing and Urban Affairs, 93d Cong., 2d Sess. 14 (1974)
[hereinafter cited as The Effect of the Bank Secrecy Act]; Hearings on S. 3814 and S.
3828 Before the Subcomm. on Financial Institutions of the Senate Comm. on Banking,
Housing and Urban Affairs, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. 41-59, 106-22 (1972) [hereinafter cited
as Amend the Bank Secrecy Act]; Hearings on H.R. 15073 Before the House Comm. on
Banking and Currency, 91st Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 10 (1969-70).
3. See notes 6-10 & accompanying text infra.
4. The Administrative Procedure Act vests power in federal employees presiding
over administrative hearings and investigations to "issue subpoenas authorized by law." 5
U.S.C. § 556(c) (2) (1970). Specific legislation authorizing exercise of administrative
subpoena power is available to most of the major agencies of the federal government.
E.g., INT. RIv. CODE OF 1954, § 7602; 42 U.S.C. § 405(d) (1970) (HEW); 15 U.S.C. §
78u(b) (1970) (SEC); 15 U.S.C. H§ 49-50 (1970 & Supp. IV, 1975) (FTC); 29 U.S.C.
§ 209 (1970) Sec'ty of Labor); 7 U.S.C. § 511n (1970) (Secty of Agriculture); 8
U.S.C. § 1225 (1970) (INS).
In California, the head of each department of the state government is empowered to
issue administrative subpoenas to compel the attendance and testimony of witnesses and
production of books and records relevant to any civil investigation under the jurisdiction
of that department. CAL. Gov'T CODE 8H 11180-11191 (West 1966). A number of
California statutes govern use of the subpoenas by specific state agencies. E.g., CAL.
REv. & TAx CODE § 19254, 26423 (West 1970) (Franchise Tax Board); CAL. Gov'T
CODE § 15613 (West 1963) (State Board of Equalization); CAL. CORP. CODE §
29561(b),(c) (West Supp. 1976) (Department of Corporations); CAL. PUB. UTm. CoDE
§ 311 (West 1975) (Public Utilities Commission).
Authority to issue administrative subpoenas is also found in some local branches of
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Federal tax investigations are the most common instances in which
citizens are affected by the use of the administrative subpoena. In
addition to being the statutory mechanism whereby the Internal
Revenue Service conducts audits of books and records in the taxpayer's
possession, the administrative subpoena is used to delve into records
compiled and possessed by third parties (employers, accountants,
banks) which have a bearing on the individual's tax liability. IRS
access to such third party records is often obtained without notice to
the taxpayer, without intervention of the judiciary to guard against over-
broad or unlawful use of the administrative subpoena, and in the case
of information held by banks, often without the taxpayer being aware
that detailed records of his activities are available.
In response to the possibility that the use of administrative sub-
poenas may infringe upon the civil rights of taxpayers, the House Ways
and Means Committee has recently proposed a modification of IRS
subpoena procedure in a provision of the voluminous Tax Reform Act
of 1975.5 In several important respects this act would ameliorate the
existing infirmities of the administrative subpoena procedure as it is
used by the IRS against third party recordholders. This note focuses
in particular on the problem of requests for information made of banks
by the IRS. However, the comment and analysis herein are generally
relevant to IRS inquiry of any third party recordholder not enjoying a
privileged relationship with the taxpayer. Also, while this note concen-
trates on reforms in the administrative subpoena procedure used by the
IRS, other administrative subpoena procedures and accompanying case
law discussed in this note will remain unaffected by the Tax Reform
Act and will continue to be relevant to administrative inquiries made
of third party recordholders.
In order to illustrate the importance and effect of the proposed
changes in IRS administrative subpoena procedure, this note will first
describe the reason for and extent of bank recordkeeping, and will
second discuss the administrative subpoena procedure as it is now con-
stituted. Third, a comparison of the present law and the proposed
changes will be made. This comparison will be sudivided for conven-
ience into four subsections: (1) notice to the taxpayer that his bank
records have been subpoenaed; (2) the right of a taxpayer to intervene
in an enforcement proceeding where the bank declines voluntary com-
pliance with the subpoena; (3) the right of a taxpayer to enjoin his
bank from voluntarily complying with an administrative subpoena; (4)
government. E.g., SAN FRANCISCO, CAL. ADM. CODE § 16.37-9 (1974) (San Francisco
Retirement Board); id. § 12B.2(f)(6) (1974) (San Francisco Human Rights Commis-
sion).
5. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1211 (1975).
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substantive defenses to enforcement of an administrative subpoena.
The final section of this note will examine particular problems pre-
sented by "John Doe" subpoenas used to obtain information where the
IRS is unable to identify the particular taxpayer under investigation.
Bank Recordkeeping: The Bank Secrecy Act
Commercial banks today engage in many types of customer
services, each generating voluminous records. The information con-
tained reveals more than credit worthiness, wealth, and income. In the
course of dealing with banks, a depositor reveals his activities, habits,
and personal associations. Access to this kind of information obviously
facilitates IRS (as well as other governmental) investigations. This
fact was noted and acted upon by Congress when it passed the so-called
Bank Secrecy Act,0 a law based upon the notion that "adequate records
maintained by insured banks have a high degree of usefulness in crimi-
nal, tax, and regulatory investigations and proceedings." The Bank
Secrecy Act and its attendant regulations' require banks to copy and
retain records of virtually every aspect of depositor transactions. For
example, the act requires banks and similar financial institutions to
retain information on the identities of their account holders and to make
and retain copies of all instruments of account holder transactions
involving more than $100.9 Not only must these materials be corn-
6. Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, 84 Stat. 1114. The Bank Secrecy
Act is codified at 12 U.S.C. §§ 1829b, 1730d (retention of records by insured banks and
savings and loan institutions); id. §§ 1951-59 (retention of records by all uninsured
financial institutions); and 31 U.S.C. §§ 1051-1122 (1970) (reporting of domestic and
foreign currency transactions).
7. Act of Oct. 26, 1970, Pub. L. No. 91-508, § 101, 84 Stat. 1114.
8. The Bank Secrecy Act authorizes the secretary of the Treasury to issue
regulations to carry out its purposes. 12 U.S.C. § 1829b(b) (1970). The secretary is
empowered to define institutions or persons affected, to make exceptions, exemptions or
other special arrangements, to seek injunctions, and to assess and collect civil penalties.
Id. §§ 1953(a), (b)(5), 1829b(c),(f), 1954, 1955.
9. Banks must maintain copies of signature cards, ledger cards, and the deposi-
tor's social security or taxpayer identification number. 31 C.F.R. § 103.34 (1975).
Copies of checks upon which the bank is the drawee must be maintained unless (1) the
item is for less than $100, or (2) the check is for payroll, employee benefits, government
agencies, or other exceptions specifically listed in section 103.34(b)(3). Until the
amendment of January 19, 1973, 38 Fed. Reg. 2175-76 (1973), there was no exemption
for checks under $100. For a discussion of this exemption see Amend the Bank Secrecy
Act, supra note 2, at 78. Banks which at present photocopy or record checks deposited
to their customers' accounts in the ordinary course of business must retain such records
for two years pursuant to 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.34(b)(10), 301.36(c) (1975). Other rec-
ords required by section 103.34 must be retained for five years. 31 C.F.R. § 103.36(c)
(1975).
It has been estimated that a minimum of 20 billion checks, and perhaps 30 billion,
are -hotocopied per year, at a weight of approximately 166 million pounds per year. See
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piled, but the bank, under the act, must make a monthly report to the
Treasury Department of most domestic transactions exceeding $10,000
and foreign transactions exceeding $5,000.10 These reporting require-
ments ensure that the federal government is constantly apprised of all
big money transactions in which banks are intermediaries.
Even as to transactions not automatically reported to the federal
government, the Bank Secrecy Act's recordkeeping requirements pro-
vide potentially widespread access to bank records by government
agencies under the administrative subpoena power. The Bank Secrecy
Act does not contain any restrictions on disclosure and in the past the
government's requests for information stored by banks in accordance
with the requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act have been honored by
banks usually without the necessity of a formal judicial enforcement
proceeding. 1 These judicially unscrutinized inspections of bank ac-
counts pose the most serious threat to civil liberties, particularly when
they take the form of government surveillance of politically dissident
individuals. 12
Hearings on H.R. 15073 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 10,320 (1969-70). It has been stated that many banks have found
recordkeeping to the extent required by the Bank Secrecy Act to be unnecessary to the
efficient operation of business, and superfluous in light of modern data processing
techniques, and that absent the demands of the Bank Secrecy Act, banks would not retain
such information. See The Effect of the Bank Secrecy Act, supra note 2, at 16.
10. The bank must make a monthly report to the Commissioner of Internal
Revenue, on forms provided by the Treasury Department, of any domestic currency
transaction which exceeds $10,000, unless certain exceptions apply. 31 C.F.R. § 103.22
(1975). Individuals who transport into or out of the country monetary instruments
exceeding $5,000 must report such transactions to the government. 31 C.F.R. §§
103.23-.25, (1975). Civil and criminal penalties accompany violations of these report-
ing requirements. 31 U.S.C. §§ 1056, 1058-59, 1102-03 (1970); 31 C.F.R. §§ 103.47-.49
(1975).
The Bank Secrecy Act also requires the secretary to make the reported information
concerning transactions "available for a purpose consistent with the provisions of this
chapter to any other department or agency of the Federal Government" upon request. 31
U.S.C. § 1061 (1970); 31 C.F.R. § 103.43 (1975).
11. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21, 96 (1974) (Marshall, J.,
dissenting). Bank cooperation was also present in case histories described by the
Treasury Department. Amend the Bank Secrecy Act, supra note 2, at 93-98, 104. See
also Hearings on H.R. 15073 Before the House Comm. on Banking and Currency, 91st
Cong., 1st & 2d Sess. 312-73 (1969-70).
12. See Amend the Bank Secrecy Act, supra note 2, at 135-43, 164-75, 176-77. In
discussing evidence of FBI surveillance of the checking accounts of Benjamin Spock,
Jane Fonda, and Floyd McKissick, columnist Jack Anderson commented, "[Tihe FBI
has been nosing into private bank accounts for years, with the full cooperation of bank
executives." Id. at 137-38. See also Note, California Bankers Association v. Shultz: An
Attack on the Bank Secrecy Act, 2 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 203 (1975). Free access to bank
records led to the location of Daniel Ellsberg's psychiatrist by the FBI and the burglary
of his office, which eventually led to the conviction of White House counsellor John
Ehrlichman. See The Effect of the Bank Secrecy Act, supra note 2, at 2.
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The wisdom as well as the constitutionality of the Bank Secrecy
Act has been questioned repeatedly. Neither the act nor the regula-
tions require a subpoena or other legal process before a bank can
release an individual's records to a government investigatory agency.13
There is no requirement in the act for notice to depositors that such
extensive records are kept or that mandatory reporting requirements
accompany certain transactions. And there is no realistic limitation on
dissemination once the information is in the hands of the government. 4
The tabulation and storage of such detailed and revealing information
for the purpose of government investigations have also raised serious
first amendment considerations,'" but the United States Supreme Court
has upheld the constitutionality of both the domestic reporting and
recordkeeping requirements of the act and the regulations which were
in effect at the time the Supreme Court considered the matter.' 6 Not-
withstanding, the Bank Secrecy Act remains a ripe subject of contro-
versy. 7  Legislation has been introduced in the United States Congress
13. When a bank voluntarily complies with an informal request for information,
there is no possibility of contesting the government's right to access. Cecil Poole,
former United States Attorney for the Northern District of California, testified that he
never had any problem getting bank records without a subpoena. The Effect of the
Bank Secrecy Act, supra note 2, at 186. The common procedure was to gain informal
access to the bank while assuring the bank's officers that if the information were later
needed in court or by the grand jury, a subpoena would then be issued to "cover" the
matter. Law enforcement personnel have defended such informal access by pointing to
fraud and worthless check crimes in which it is asserted that probable cause to support a
judicial subpoena cannot be established until after the bank records are obtained, and
that restrictions on the banks or notice to depositors of access would effectively halt such
investigations. See The Effect of the Bank Secrecy Act, supra note 2, at 142-156.
14. All reported information is available to other federal agencies "for a purpose
consistent with the [act]." 31 U.S.C. § 1061 (1970). The purpose of the act is broadly
stated to be "usefulness" for governmental investigations or proceedings. Id. § 1051.
15. See Note, California Bankers Association v. Shultz: An Attack on the Bank
Secrecy Act, 2 HAST. CONST. L.Q. 203 (1975).
16. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974). The recordkeep-
ing provisions were held constitutional since they contained no requirement of disclosure
to the government without legal process, and thus did not deprive the bank of due
process of law. Id. at 54. The domestic reporting requirements were upheld as not
being an unreasonable burden on the banks. Id. at 66-67. Moreover, the depositor
plaintiffs were held to lack standing to contest this requirement since they made no
allegation that their own records had been sought. Id. at 67-68. The Court noted that
the fact that the regulations do not require banks to notify depositors violates no
constitutional right of the banks, since the banks are free to adopt a customer notifica-
tion procedure. Id. at 70. Justice Powell, however, in his concurring opinion, noted
that any expansion of the reporting requirements over those presently in the regulations
would pose serious constitutional questions. Id. at 78-79. For further discussion, see
Note, California Bankers Association v. Shultz: An Attack on the Bank Secrecy Act, 2
HAST. CONST. L.Q. 203 (1975).
17. The Shultz majority did not decide whether the recordkeeping requirements
undermine bank depositors' fourth amendment rights, nor whether the automatic report-
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and in the California legislature to afford additional procedural protec-
tion to depositors.' Such legislation has yet to become law, however.
Existing Administrative Subpoena Procedure
Most demands for access to the records created by the require-
ments of the Bank Secrecy Act are made through the Internal Revenue
Service pursuant to its administrative subpoena power. Section 7602
of the Internal Revenue Code vests the IRS with broad authority to
issue subpoenas to compel production of documents and testimony of
third persons deemed relevant to the determination of tax liability. 9
This power has obvious application to records of depositors possessed
by financial institutions. The Internal Revenue Code provides that
such material may be obtained by proper service of an administrative
subpoena, signed by a duly authorized nominee of the secretary of the
treasury.2" It is clear that this power, exercised on the IRS's own initia-
tive and control and without prior judicial review is an efficient tool
much relied upon for tax investigations.
Under this statutory scheme, the person to whom the subpoena
is directed, whether a taxpayer or a third party in possession of the
desired records, can lawfully refuse to produce the materials re-
quested." The IRS may then request enforcement by filing a petition
with the district court in which the subpoenaed person resides. 2
The district court then holds an adversary hearing at which it determines
ing requirements without notice to depositors or intervention of the judiciary violate the
fourth amendment. See United States v. Miller, 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976). With respect to
the foreign transaction reporting requirements of the Bank Secrecy Act, see United States
v. San Juan, 405 F. Supp. 686 (D. Vt. 1975).
18. A significant amount of legislation has been introduced in Congress to limit
the disclosure of bank information. H.R. 16246, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); S. 3814,
92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); S. 3828, 92d Cong., 2d Sess. (1972); H.R. 8062, 93d Cong.,
1st Sess. (1973); H.R. 9563, 93d Cong., 1st Sess. (1973); S. 2200, 93d Cong., Ist Sess.
(1973). See also The Effect of the Bank Secrecy Act, supra note 2. These bills
generally provide for access only in accordance with one of four specific procedures: (1)
customer authorization; (2) administrative subpoena where the customer authorizes
compliance, or where the bank is served with a court order after notice and opportunity
to be heard by the customer; (3) search warrants, served on both the bank and the
customer; and (4) judicial subpoenas where the depositor receives a copy and where the
bank does not receive notification within a specified time period that the customer has
moved to quash.
A bill introduced into the California legislature would have restricted access in
essentially the same manner as the federal bills, but with an exception as to crime reports
of fraudulent use of checks. A.B. 1609 (1973). This bill passed the Senate and the
Assembly but was vetoed by Governor Reagan.
19. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 7601, 7602.
20. Id. § 7603.
21. See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
22. See INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, §§ 7402(b), 7604(a).
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whether to enforce the subpoena. If the court issues an enforcement
order and the subpoenaed party again fails to produce, contempt sanc-
tions may be applied. 4 The language of the statute indicates that sanc-
tions may also be imposed when a subpoenaed party interposes specious
defenses to delay compliance with the subpoena.25 The contempt
sanctions subject the subpoenaed person to a fine of not more than
$1,000 or to imprisonment for not more than one year, or both, together
with the government's costs of prosecution.26
The courts have tended towards a liberal interpretation of the sub-
poena powers given the IRS.2 7  A common rationale is the need for
a strong tax investigatory arm in light of our system of self-reporting.28
The nature of the IRS subpoena power has been compared to that of
a grand jury and distinguished from that of the courts in that the IRS,
along with other administrative agencies, has the power and affirmative
duty to satisfy itself that the law is being followed.29 Thus, the IRS
is allowed leeway to engage in what might, under traditional judicial
23. The courts have construed the subpoenaed party's statutory opportunity for an
adversary hearing as a guarantee of due process. See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440,
446 (1964). This provision, however, guarantees a hearing only to the subpoenaed
party, not to the individual whose tax liability is being investigated. Dictum in the
Reisman case that a taxpayer, when he is not a party to the proceeding, may intervene
and present defenses to enforcement of the summons was qualified in Donaldson v.
United States, 400 U.S. 517 (1971). See notes 54-62 & accompanying text infra.
24. INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7210.
25. See id. § 7604(b). If the person summoned "wholly ma[kes] default or
contumaciously refuse[s] to comply", the commissioner of Internal Revenue applies
to the district court or to a United States Commissioner for his arrest. See Reisman
v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440, 448 (1964). He is then brought into court and obliged to
post bond. A trial follows before a judge or commissioner, either of whom may, in
the absence of justification, issue appropriate enforcement orders. This section has
been used against persons who have been summoned and refuse to testify due to a
claimed privilege. See, e.g., Sale v. United States, 228 F.2d 682 (8th Cir. 1956);
Brownson v. United States, 32 F.2d 844 (8th Cir. 1929). However, the Supreme Court
suggested by way of dictum that such sanctions are improper and are grounds for
dismissal of the summons if incorrectly brought. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48,
58 (1964).
26. INT. REv. CODE OF 1954, § 7210.
27. See, e.g., United States v. Northwestern Pa. Bank & Trust Co., 355 F. Supp.
607 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
28. See, e.g., United States v. Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 145 (1975); United States
ex rel. Sathre v. Third Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 102 F. Supp. 879 (D. Minn.), appeal
dismissed, 196 F.2d 501 (8th Cir. 1952).
29. "[The power to make administrative inquiry] is not derived from the judicial
function. It is more analogous to the grand jury, which does not depend on a case or
controversy for power to get evidence but can investigate merely on suspicion that the
law is being violated, or even just because it wants assurance that it is not." United
States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 642-43 (1950), quoted in United States v.
Bisceglia, 420 U.S. 141, 148 (1975).
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criteria, be deemed "fishing expeditions.13 0  The fourth amendment's
prohibition against unreasonable searches and seizures, while generally
applicable to administrative subpoenas for the production of records,
today limits only overbroad or irrelevant inquiries.3" The requirement
of probable cause is satisfied by the enforcing court's determination that
the investigation is authorized by Congress, that it is for a purpose Con-
gress can order, and that the documents sought are relevant to the
inquiry.3 2
The formal requirements for proper use of an administrative
subpoena by the IRS are permissive: the information sought must be
relevant to the investigation; the purpose of the inquiry must be legiti-
mate (that is, not for use in a criminal prosecution, which requires
greater procedural protections for suspected lawbreakers); and the
information must not already be in the commissioner's possession.33
Summary of Proposed New Procedures for Issuance of
Administrative Subpoenas by the Internal Revenue Service
The proposed procedural amendment in the Tax Reform Act of
1975 would introduce dramatic new restraints upon the ability of the
IRS to gain access to the vast system of bank records now maintained
in accordance with the Bank Secrecy Act. Under the proposed act,
a subpoena issued to a bank would be required to contain certain iden-
tifying information, such as the identity of the taxpayer under investiga-
tion (if known) and a sufficient description of the materials requested
to indicate exactly what records should be produced. 4 This, of course,
serves to guard against overbroad requests for information.
The IRS would also be required to send contemporaneous notice
of the subpoena by registered or certified mail to the person or persons
identified as the subject of the subpoena.35  The notice must include
the purpose for which the information is sought. The legislative history
accompanying the Tax Reform Act indicates that the IRS will also be
expected to enclose with the subpoena a clear summary of the tax-
payer's legal rights.36
30. See generally United States v. Berkowitz, 488 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1973);
United States v. Turner, 480 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1973); Falsone v. United States, 205
F.2d 734 (5th Cir.), cert. denied, 346 U.S. 864 (1953); United States v. Bremicker, 365
F. Supp. 701 (D. Minn. 1973); Barnes, Inquisitorial Powers of the Federal Government
Relating to Taxes. 28 TAXES 1211 (1950).
31. See United States v. Morton Salt Co., 338 U.S. 632, 651-52 (1950); Hale v.
Henkel, 201 U.S. 43 (1906).
32. See Oklahoma Press Publishing Co. v. Walling, 327 U.S. 186 (1940).
33. See United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48, 57-58 (1964).
34. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1211(a) (3) (1975).
35. Id. § 1211(a)(1).
36. See H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 308 (1975).
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After serving the bank with the suppoena and notifying the tax-
payer that access to his records is sought, the service would be required
to wait fourteen days before attempting to obtain the records.3" The
taxpayer would have the right within that fourteen day period to notify
the bank not to comply, and to notify the service that the bank has been
so instructed.18  The service would then be required to institute an
enforcement proceeding in the district court if it wished to pursue the
matter.3" The parties to the enforcement hearing would be the bank
and the service, and the bank could present whatever defenses to en-
forcement are available under present law. More important, the act
would specifically entitle the taxpayer to intervene in the enforcement
proceeding and to defend against enforcement of the subpoena.40  The
taxpayer would have standing to present certain defenses which are
available to the bank but which, perhaps, the bank declines to raise.41
The taxpayer would also have the opportunity to raise defenses which
the bank is unable to raise on his behalf, due to the absence of a privi-
leged relationship.4
The Tax Reform Act would also establish a specific procedure for
IRS attempts to obtain both financial information and the identity of
the taxpayer through use of the administrative subpoena.43  The exist-
ing procedure does not distinguish between use of the subpoena power
to obtain information regarding a named taxpayer and its use to dis-
cover the identity of the taxpayer. Since the use of the "John Doe"
subpoena presents different considerations, it will be examined separ-
ately at the end of this note.
The significance of the changes proposed in the Tax Reform Act
is best illustrated by a comparative examination of the present law on
these points. Briefly, the existing procedure does not provide for
notice to the depositor-taxpayer of attempted or successful access to
bank records, does not entitle the taxpayer to instruct his bank not to
comply voluntarily with the subpoena, and does not give the taxpayer
the right to intervene in the enforcement proceeding to present his
defenses to enforcement of the subpoena. Due to various theoretical
difficulties, the courts have not otherwise extended these rights to tax-
payers. The following discussion will examine these theoretical diffi-
culties and will emphasize the need for reform of the IRS subpoena
procedure, reform which the Tax Reform Act, if enacted, will
accomplish.
37. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., lstSess. § 1211(d)(1) (1975).
38. Id. § 1211(b)(2).
39. Id. § 1211(d)(2).
40. Id. § 1211(b)(1).
41. See H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1975).
42. Id. See notes 128-140 & accompanying text, infra.
43. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1211(f) (1975).
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Notice
The existing statutes authorizing use and enforcement of adminis-
trative subpoenas by the IRS do not provide for notice to the taxpayer
that requests for information have been made of third party record-
holders. The lower federal courts have found no collateral authority
for extending to taxpayers this right to notice.4 4  Moreover, in the
recent case of United States v. Miller,45 the Supreme Court expressly
noted that a bank's failure to notify its depositors of IRS access to bank
records was without legal consequence, a conclusion which followed
from the Court's holding that depositors cannot invoke fourth amend-
ment protections against unreasonable search and seizure as a defense
to an IRS search of bank records.4 6 Miller makes it clear that if a right
to notice is to be afforded the depositor-taxpayer, it must appear within
the statutory authorization for use of administrative subpoenas.
The Internal Revenue Service has understandably resisted the
institution of a notice requirement, at least prior to gaining access to
the desired records, due to the possibility that the taxpayer will either
abscond once he learns of the investigation, attempt to conceal or
obscure his records, or, at least, direct the bank not to comply voluntar-
ily, forcing the IRS to go to court for an enforcement order. But the
depositor may well have a valid interest in protecting bank-held infor-
mation and in some cases may even have legal grounds to challenge
access. To deny him notice of attempted or successful access is to deny
him the opportunity to interpose valid legal defenses.
It seems unwise for policy reasons to vest in the bank total discre-
tion with respect to resisting the unlawful use of the IRS inquisitorial
power. Under current procedure, the banker is put in the position of
neutral magistrate; he alone must balance the needs of the IRS against
the privacy interests of a depositor in deciding whether to notify his
customer. The banker is ill-equipped to perform this quasi-judicial
role. He may yield too quickly to glib persuasions on the part of the
agent; he may simply acquiesce to avoid the bother of the whole
affair; 47 or he may not understand that he can lawfully refuse to comply
with an administrative subpoena.4 Admittedly, the latter possibility is
unlikely given the ubiquity of the legal departments of today's banks.
But branch officers cannot be expected to understand administrative
44. See Scarafiotti v. Shea, 456 F.2d 1052 (10th Cir. 1972); Application of Cole,
342 F.2d 5 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965). But see United States v. Union
Nat'l Bank, 363 F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
45. 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976).
46. Id. at 1622.
47. The banking industry does not wish to assume responsibility for these deci-
sions. See Amend the Batik Secrecy Act, supra note 2, at 228-29.
48. Id. at 232.
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procedure and unless they have been adequately briefed by their legal
department, they may be inherently willing to comply with any docu-
ment marked "subpoena" or "summons." In the absence of a statutory
requirement, what notice instructions, if any, are supplied to branch
personnel is a function of the bank's policy, which in turn may simply
reflect the social and political views of its management. 49
The Tax Reform Act would resolve these arguments by requiring
notice to the taxpayer. Failure to observe this requirement would pre-
sumably render the subpoena unenforceable. If it were not challenged
at the enforcement proceeding, the taxpayer would arguably be entitled
to suppress the evidence at trial on the ground that it was obtained
illegally . 0
Taxpayer Intervention in Enforcement Proceedings
Absolute Right to Intervene
The Tax Reform Act would specifically entitle the depositor
whose tax liability is in question to intervene5' in an enforcement pro-
ceeding initiated by the IRS when the bank refuses voluntary compli-
ance with the subpoena,5" either of its own motion or where compelled
by the notified depositor.5" The significance of this change is made
apparent by an examination of a taxpayer's present ability to intervene
in such a proceeding. This is a highly complex area of the law which
involves issues of fundamental constitutional rights and on which the
California Supreme Court and the United States Supreme Court are in
disagreement. 54  Although the Tax Reform Act would statutorily side-
step these issues insofar as IRS administrative subpoenas are con-
cerned, the law discussed below highlights the need for the statutory
remedy provided by the Tax Reform Act. Moreover, the current case
49. In telephone interviews, representatives of the legal departments of several
large San Francisco banks expressed concern over this issue but indicated that their
banks refuse compliance with an administrative subpoena until after notification of the
depositor. Interview with Marsha D. Rabkin, Attorney, Bank of America, December 15,
1975; interview with Donald F. Reed, Wells Fargo Bank, January 16, 1976. The
distinction between administrative and judicial subpoenas was unclear to branch person-
nel, but they said they always called their legal departments before divulging any
information.
50. Cf. United States v. Blue, 384 U.S. 251 (1966).
51. The Federal Rules of Civil Procedure provide for two forms of intervention:
intervention as of right, and permissive intervention. FED. R. Civ. P. 24(a), (b). In
general, in order to support intervention as of right, an intervenor must have a property
interest in the transaction which is the subject of the litigation.
52. H.R.10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1211(a) (1975).
53. Id. § 1211(b)(2).
54. Compare Burrows v. Superior Court, 13 Cal. 3d 238, 529 P.2d 590, 118 Cal.
Rptr. 166 (1974), with United States v. Miller, 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976).
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law outlined below will continue to control the rights of depositors to
challenge disclosure of information to other administrative agencies
using administrative subpoenas.
The United States Supreme Court has never specifically consid-
ered a depositor's right to contest a subpoena of his bank records in
a proceeding against his bank to enforce an administrative subpoena.55
In Donaldson v. United States,56 however, the Court denied a taxpayer's
attempt to intervene as a matter of right5 7 in an enforcement proceed-
ing where the IRS subpoena directed the taxpayer's former employer
to produce salary and other records relating to the taxpayer. This
denial was founded upon a problem involving information possessed by
third parties: Lacking ownership or possession of the records, a taxpayer
cannot demonstrate the legal property interest necessary to support inter-
vention rights unless he enjoys a privileged or judicially recognized con-
fidential relationship with the record holder.5 8  For instance, the fourth
amendment as it has traditionally been applied does not provide the
basis of a right to intervene since it does not guarantee to a person
security against search, reasonable or unreasonable, in papers which
are not that person's property and are not in his possession." Similarly,
the courts have held that the right of a person to assert the fifth amend-
ment privileges against self-incrimination is essentially of a personal na-
ture and therefore is not available to a depositor to prevent the subpoena
of bank records. In Couch v. United States,60 the Supreme Court re-
marked:
As Mr. Justice Holmes put it: "A party is privileged from produc-
ing the evidence but not from its production." The Constitution
explicitly prohibits compelling an accused to bear witness "against
himself": it necessarily does not proscribe incriminating state-
ments elicited from another. Compulsion upon the person assert-
ing it is an important element of the privilege . . . . It is extor-
tion of information from the accused himself that offends our sense
of justice.61
The decision in Donaldson is consistent with this view. Merely
because the employee's tax liability was the underlying subject of the
55. In a recent case the Court concluded that the depositors' objections were
premature, as no subpoena had issued. California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21
(1974). An earlier case dealt with bank challenges. See United States v. First Nat'l
Bank of Mobile, 295 F. 142 (1924), afj'd, 267 U.S. 576 (1925).
56. 400 U.S. 517 (1971).
57. Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 24(a)(2) allows intervention as a matter of
right by an individual who has "an interest relating to the property . . . which is the
subject of the action" and who "is so situated that the disposition of the action may as a
practical matter impair or impede his ability to protect that interest .
58. 400 U.S. 517, 530-31 (1971).
59. See In re Upham's Income Tax, 18 F. Supp. 737, 738 (S.D.N.Y. 1937).
60. 409 U.S. 322 (1973).
61. Id. at 328 (citation omitted).
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subpoena did not confer upon him the right to intervene in a proceed-
ing where the records were the property of and in the possession of
the employer. Records which are compiled and possessed by a bank
are analogous to employer records in that the depositor lacks both
ownership of the records and a privileged relationship with their holder.
Thus the lower courts have used Donaldson as authority to deny deposi-
tors standing to challenge subpoenas directed to their banks.6 2
The Miller Case: No Expectation of
Privacy in Bank Records
The Donaldson Court referred to "confidential relationships" as
a basis of intervention by right.63  Until 1976 it might have been
argued that an expectation that such a relationship would not be
invaded by the government extended fourth amendment protections to
at least some records in the possession of third parties. This argument
would have been founded upon the redefinition of fourth amendment
protections in Katz v. United States64 to include that which a reasonable
person would expect to be private. But in April 1976, the Supreme
Court, in United States v. Miller, 5 held that depositors cannot advance
62. See Garrett v. United States, 511 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1975); United States v.
National State Bank, 454 F.2d 1249, 1251 n.3, 1252 (7th Cir. 1972); SEC v. First
Security Bank, 447 F.2d 166, 168 (10th Cir. 1971); United States v. Bremicker, 365 F.
Supp. 701, 702 (D. Minn. 1973); United States v. Union Nat'l Bank, 363 F. Supp. 629,
632-33 (W.D. Pa. 1973); United States v. Northwest Pa. Bank & Trust Co., 355 F. Supp.
607, 611-13 (W.D. Pa. 1973); Smith v. Switzer, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 1[ 9490 (W.D. Pa.
May 30, 1973). See also United States v. Luther, 481 F.2d 429, 433 (9th Cir. 1973)
(taxpayer lacked proprietary interest in corporate records); cf. Fifth Ave. Peace Parade
Comm. v. Gray, 480 F.2d 326, 332 (2d Cir. 1973) (depositors have no cause of action
for bank's voluntary surrender of signature cards to FBI agents).
The gravamen of Donaldson is that the mere fact that one's tax liability is the
underlying subject of the subpoena is insufficient by itself to confer the right to intervene
where the subpoena is directed to a third party recordholder. The circuits had been in
conflict on this point. Compare United States v. Benford, 406 F.2d 1192 (7th Cir.
1969); United States v. Bank of Commerce, 405 F.2d 931 (3d Cir. 1969); and Justice
v. United States, 365 F.2d 312 (6th Cir. 1966), with O'Donnell v. Sullivan, 364 F.2d 43
(1st Cir.), cert. denied, 385 U.S. 969 (1966), and Application of Cole, 342 F.2d 5 (2d
Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950 (1965).
63. 400 U.S. at 522, 530-31.
64. 389 U.S. 347 (1967). Katz declared that where a person has a subjective and
reasonable expectation of privacy, this expectation must be upheld. While a depositor
does not own or control his bank records, he could argue that he has a property right in
the information those records contain. See California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S.
21, 96 (Marshall, J., dissenting); Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936),
rev'd 105 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1939). For an extended treatment of the application of the
fourth amendment to bank records see Note, Government Access to Bank Records, 83
YALE L.J. 1439 (1974).
65. 96S. Ct. 1619 (1976).
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such an argument to support fourth amendment rights in their bank
records. Bank records, the Supreme Court held, are not personal
papers, but are the business records of a bank. A depositor has no
reasonable expectation of privacy in those records since: (1) checks
are negotiable instruments in commerce; (2) bank documents contain
information voluntarily disclosed to banks in the ordinary course of
business; and (3) Congress assumed the lack of legitimate expectations
of privacy when it passed the Bank Secrecy Act.66 A depositor takes
the risk, when he reveals his affairs to another, that the information
will be conveyed to the government, even where the information is
revealed for a limited purpose and with confidence that the communi-
cation will not be betrayed.
The Burrows Case: Expectation of Privacy Upheld
Some state courts are not so willing to dismiss fourth amendment
claims by bank depositors and thus arguably would be inclined to find
an absolute right of depositors to intervene in subpoena enforcement
proceedings by state agencies against their banks. The California
Supreme Court in Burrows v. Superior Court6 7 construed the state con-
stitution's equivalent of the fourth amendment in accordance with Katz
v. United States68 and held that a bank customer has a reasonable
expectation that, absent legal process, the matters a depositor reveals
to his bank will only be used for internal purposes.
In Burrows, the police had made an informal oral request of a
bank regarding all of Burrows' accounts. The bank provided the infor-
mation without first requesting a judicial subpoena. The California
Supreme Court reversed a conviction on the ground that the evidence
upon which the conviction was based had been obtained in violation
of Burrows' fourth amendment rights:
It cannot be gainsaid that the customer of a bank expects that 'the
documents, such as checks, which he transmits to the bank in the
course of his business operations, will remain private, and that
[this] expectation is reasonable ....
* * * That the bank alters the form in which it records the
information transmitted to it by the depositor to show the receipt
and disbursement of money on a bank statement does not diminish
the depositor's anticipation of privacy in the matters which he con-
fides to the bank.69
The Burrows court, unlike other courts, 70 recognized that information
66. Id. at 1623-24.
67. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 242-45, 529 P.2d 590, 592-95, 118 Cal. Rptr. 168-71 (1974).
68. 389 U.S. 347 (1967).
69. 13 Cal. 3d at 243, 529 P.2d at 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
70. Cf. Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316, 318 (9th Cir. 1969); United States
v. Bank of Commerce, 405 F.2d 931, 934 (3d Cir. 1969).
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compiled by a bank does not become the exclusive property of a bank
by means of microfilming and storage. Thus, under Burrows, a
depositor, while relinquishing physical possession of the documents
which contain information, need not relinquish protection of the fourth
amendment as to that information if it is cloaked with a reasonable
expectation of privacy.
Having established that depositors have a privacy interest in their
bank records, the Burrows court went on to consider whether the police
unreasonably interferred with that interest. (The fourth amendment
is not infringed unless there has been unreasonable search and
seizure.) The court noted that where disclosure is obtained pursuant
to an informal request, the only determination of scope and relevance
is made by the police. In holding that a search of records under those
circumstances was unreasonable, the court stated that if the information
so obtained were admissible, there would be nothing to prevent the
police from informally requesting and receiving all of a person's
records, whether or not relevant to a crime under investigation.7" In
rebutting the government's contention that the bank and not the police
conducted the search, the court said that if recognition is given to a
depositor's reasonable expectation of privacy in bank records, then a
bank as a neutral entity cannot validly consent to an invasion of the
depositor's rights.72
71. 13 Cal. 3d at 243, 529 P.2d at 593, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 169.
72. Id. at 244-45, 529 P.2d at 594, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 170. This reasoning suggests
an intriguing problem. If a depositor has a recognized expectation of privacy in his
bank records, does civil liability in damages attach to a bank when it discloses
information in the absence of "legal process"? Banks have long been subject to liability
on an implied contract theory for disclosure of records to private parties without the
consent of the depositor. See Milohnich v. First Nat'l Bank, 224 So. 2d 759 (Fla. Dist
Ct. App. 1969); Peterson v. Idaho First Nat'l Bank, 83 Idaho 578, 367 P.2d 284 (1961);
Tournier v. National Provincial & Union Bank, [1924] 1 K.B. 461 (C.A.). See also
Zimmerman v. Wilson, 81 F.2d 847 (3d Cir. 1936), rev'd, 105 F.2d 583 (3d Cir. 1939);
Sparks v. Union Trust Co., 256 N.C. 478, 124 S.E.2d 365 (1962); Brex v. Smith, 104
N.J. Eq. 386, 146 A. 34 (Ch. 1929). Exceptions to the duty of secrecy exist where the
customer consents to a release of information, where the bank must disclose data in its
own business interests (e.g., to collect an overdraft), or when a public duty mandates
disclosure "to prevent fraud or crimes." Tournier v. National Provincial & Union Bank,
[1924] 1 K.B. 461, 473, 481 (C.A.).
No case has specifically decided the issue of whether there is a duty of secrecy as to
inquiries of government officials. In a Florida case, although the court noted that the
instant complaint for breach of implied contract stated a cause of action against the bank
for release of information to third parties, the decision did not address disclosure
requested by the government or under compulsion of law. Milohnich v. First Nat'l
Bank, 224 So. 759, 762 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1969). A New Jersey court, however,
expressly prohibited release of information to a public prosecutor. Brex v. Smith, 104
N.J. Eq., 146 A. 34 (Ch. 1929). A governmental exception to the duty of secrecy could
be justified only by the rationale that the government seeks information for the public
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The California Supreme Court's decision in Burrows is a limited
one since only the California Constitution was relied upon, even though
the relevant language is identical to that of the fourth amendment to
the United States Constitution. Furthermore, although the decision
clearly requires law enforcement agents to produce valid "legal proc-
ess""3 before they may search or seize customers' records, this term is
nowhere defined in the decision. Thus, the adequacy of an administra-
tive subpoena not backed by a court order is not clear.
No federal court has used the Burrows analysis to confer standing
on a taxpayer who wishes to contest an administrative subpoena of his
bank records,74 and in light of the Miller decision, it seems impossible
that this will follow.75 However, the Tax Reform Act, if enacted,
would ensure that whenever the IRS seeks taxpayer information con-
tained in bank records, the taxpayer will enjoy the same right to inter-
vene that is likely to be spawned in California by the Burrows
decision.76
Permissive Intervention
The Court in United States v. Miller clearly stated the implication
welfare and that investigating agents are presumed to adhere to legitimate inquiries. Cf.
United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 67 F. Supp. 616, 624-25 (S.D. Ala. 1946). It could be
argued, however, that because courts, not governmental officials, are the institutions
which usually balance the public welfare against individual rights, banks might be liable
for giving information to the government.
73. 13 Cal. 3d 238, 247, 529 P.2d 590, 596, 118 Cal. Rptr. 166, 172 (1974).
74. The Burrows court did note with some deference the federal cases concerning
administrative subpoenas and depositors' present lack of standing to resist bank produc-
tion, but indicated that these cases must be narrowly read in light of Katz. Id. at 244,
529 P.2d at 594, 118 Cal. Rptr. at 170.
The California Supreme Court also has held that where in the course of a private
lawsuit a litigant seeks access to bank records of his opponent during discovery, the bank
must notify its depositor of the request and allow the depositor time to object to the
disclosure. Valley Bank v. Superior Court, 15 Cal. 3d 652, 542 P.2d 977, 125 Cal. Rptr.
553 (1975).
75. Justices Brennan and Marshall dissented from the decision in Miller. Justice
Marshall maintained that the Bank Secrecy Act is unconstitutional per se and hence the
government cannot rely on records kept pursuant to it in prosecuting bank customers.
United States v. Miller, 96 S. Ct. 1619, 1629-30 (1976). Justice Brennan quoted the
Burrows decision at length and commented that this decision, "illustrates the emerging
trend among high state courts of relying upon state constitutional protections of
individual liberties-protections pervading counterpart provisions of the United States
Constitution, but increasingly being ignored by decisions of this Court." Id. at 1629
(footnote omitted).
76. The California intervention statute does not distinguish between intervention
of right and permissive intervention. The court in its discretion may grant intervention
to any person who has an interest in the litigation. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 387
(West 1973). The Burrows decision would seem to establish that depositors have a
fourth amendment interest in bank records sufficient to confer intervention rights under
the statute.
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of the Donaldson opinion: a depositor does not automatically have an
interest in bank records such that he may contest disclosure to a govern-
ment investigatory agency. 77 However, in line with an earlier group
of cases, both Donaldson and Miller imply that permissive intervention
might at the court's discretion be allowed where the intervenor has a
sufficiently protectable interest, 78 for instance, where the IRS issues
an administrative subpoena for the unauthorized purpose of obtaining
evidence in a criminal investigation or prosecution for violation of the
tax laws.79
The courts have consistently held that it is an improper use of
process for the IRS to use an administrative subpoena solely to aid in
investigating and compiling evidence for a criminal prosecution." A
subpoena is unenforceable where the court finds that this is its sole pur-
pose.81 The difficulty lies in the required finding of a purely criminal
purpose behind the subpoena. Often the motives of the IRS are
mixed: a civil investigation may have the potential of resulting in
criminal liability or may be proceeding simultaneously with a criminal
investigation.
In Donaldson the Court considered enforcement of a subpoena
issued under section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code where dual
purposes for the subpoena could be found. The IRS agent had issued
subpoenas to the taxpayer's former employer and the employer's ac-
countant. No indictment or recommendation for criminal prosecu-
tion had been made. The taxpayer attempted to intervene in the
enforcement proceeding, urging that the subpoena was improper
because it was in aid of an investigation which had the potential of
resulting in a criminal prosecution. The Court rejected the taxpayer's
argument, noting that any tax investigation which reveals liability has
77. See note 62 & accompanying text supra.
78. The Fifth Circuit court of appeals has taken the position that Donaldson may
preclude even discretionary intervention. A taxpayer supported his petition for interven-
tion with an allegation identical to that put forth by the employee in Donaldson. This
allegation was clearly insufficient to support intervention of right. However, noting the
public policy in favor of expeditious tax investigations, the court held that Donaldson
also compels rejection of intervention on discretionary grounds. United States v.
Newman, 441 F.2d 165 (5th Cir. 1971).
79. See Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 529-30 (1971); United States v.
Miller, 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976).
80. See, e.g., United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1973).
81. United States v. Roundtree, 420 F.2d 845 (5th Cir. 1969); Wild v. United
States, 362 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1966); United States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248 (D.
Mass. 1953). INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, §§ 7601, 7602 authorizes use of the administra-
tive subpoena in investigations regarding civil tax liability. When he is the subject of a
criminal investigation, a taxpayer enjoys greater constitutional protections. See United
States v. Stamp, 458 F.2d 759, 774-80 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842
(1972).
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the potential for criminal sanctions if fraud is shown. The Court held
that an administrative subpoena is improper only if its sole purpose is
to gain evidence in a criminal prosecution. As an example, the Court
cited a situation in which a criminal prosecution has been instituted and
is pending at the time of the issuance of the subpoena. So long as the
investigation is likely to lead to both civil liability and criminal prosecu-
tion,82 or even if the alleged purpose of the subpoena is to uncover
crime but no criminal prosecution has yet been initiated,83 the subpoena
is proper. Furthermore, the Court held that the language authorizing
the IRS to issue administrative subpoenas does not limit issuance to civil
investigations. 84
The Donaldson Court did, however, specifically provide for
permissive intervention in the event of a showing of sole criminal inves-
tigative purpose. 85 The problem for the taxpayer is how to make a
substantial showing that will convince the court that the equities of
intervention, with its attendant delays for discovery, outweigh the need
for the swift and efficient administration of the tax laws. 6 The courts
following Donaldson have looked to whether the subpoena is issued in
good faith and prior to a recommendation for criminal prosecution.8"
Good Faith Issuance
There seems to be no agreement among the courts as to what
constitutes good faith.88 Despite differing interpretations of good faith,
few cases have found it lacking. One case found bad faith where the
82. See, e.g., Wild v. United States, 362 F.2d 206 (9th Cir. 1966); Boren v.
Tucker, 239 F.2d 767 (9th Cir. 1956); United States v. Crespo, 281 F. Supp. 928 (D.
Md. 1968).
83. See, e.g., United States v. Ruggeiro, 425 F.2d 1069 (9th Cir. 1970); United
States v. Erdner, 422 F.2d 835 (3d Cir. 1970).
84. Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 535 (1971). See also United States
v. Stamp, 458 F.2d 759 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert. denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972).
85. 400 U.S. at 530.
86. See Garrett v. United States, 511 F.2d 1037 (9th Cir. 1975).
87. See United States v. Kessler, 338 F. Supp. 420 (S.D. Ohio 1972); United
States v. Wall Corp., 475 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1972); United States v. Troupe, 438 F.2d
117 (8th Cir. 1971). Some courts do not use the "recommendation for prosecution" as
the turning point, but adhere to a "sole purpose to aid the criminal prosecution" test.
United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1973).
88. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964) (harassing the taxpayer); United
States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 474 F.2d 1234 (6th Cir. 1973) (where opening of civil tax
investigation of taxpayer was initiated by strike force assigned to investigate organized
crime, the court ruled the district court's finding of bad faith "clearly erroneous");
United States v. Wall Corp., 475 F.2d 893 (D.C. Cir. 1972) (bad faith is a firm purpose
on the part of the agent to recommend criminal prosecution); United States v. DeLuca,
72-2 U.S. Tax Cas. % 9738 (E.D.N.Y. 1972) (good faith is a legitimate purpose for the
subpoena, combined with seeking only relevant and necessary material).
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government refused to comply with a court order compelling produc-
tion of the government's work papers in camera.8 9 The court held that
such refusal would prevent the taxpayer from making any meaningful
inquiries as to the issuance of the subpoena and thus raised an infer-
ence of bad faith." Except for this one isolated holding, the burden
of proof has been on the taxpayer to establish bad faith.9 This bur-
den is difficult to sustain since the necessary evidence is usually held
by the IRS. In any event, the courts seem reluctant to make a finding
that bad faith has occurred.92
Recommendation for Criminal Prosecution
A more fruitful way for the taxpayer to make a showing of sole
criminal investigative purpose behind issuance of an administrative sub-
poena is based on the timing of IRS investigatory procedures. 93 Civil
tax investigations are conducted by revenue agents. If in the context
of a civil investigation, a revenue agent suspects that fraud may be
involved, he refers the case to the Intelligence Division of the IRS.
A preliminary investigation is conducted by a special agent and if he
believes further inquiries are warranted, the case becomes a joint
investigation of the revenue (civil) agent and special (criminal) agent,
with the special agent in charge. The special agent will eventually sub-
mit his report recommending prosecution to his superior and, if
approved, to the assistant regional commissioner for review. If
approved at that level, the report still must be approved in turn by the
regional counsel, by the chief counsel of the IRS, by the office of the
U.S. attorney general, and by a federal grand jury.94 An administra-
tive subpoena could conceivably be issued to a bank at any of these
steps. Probably the only point at which an allegation of sole criminal
purpose would be sufficiently persuasive would be after the special
89. United States v. Kessler, 73-2 U.S. Tax Cas. I 9781 (S.D. Ohio 1973).
90. Id.
91. See, e.g., United States v. Crespo, 281 F. Supp. 928 (D. Md. 1968); United
States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454 (6th Cir. 1973).
92. See, e.g., United States v. Hodgson, 492 F.2d 1175 (10th Cir. 1974) (held,
information sought was not for use solely in criminal prosecution, even though taxpayer
had been before the court on four charges of criminal offenses and had default judgment
rendered against him for unpaid taxes); United States v. Cleveland Trust Co., 474 F.2d
1234 (6th Cir. 1973). But see United States v. Zack, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. V 9497 (D.
Nev. 1974). In Zack the court quashed a subpoena where a search warrant had issued
prior to the administrative subpoena. Even though no recommendation for criminal
prosecution had been made, the court noted that a search warrant will issue only upon a
showing of probable cause that a crime had been committed.
93. See 6 CCH 1966 STAND. FED. TAX REP. V 5988.
94. Id. See also United States v. Stamp, 458 F.2d 759 (D.C. Cir. 1971), cert.
denied, 409 U.S. 842 (1972); United States v. Crespo, 281 F. Supp. 928 (D. Md. 1968).
IRS ACCESS TO BANK RECORDSSeptember 19761
agent has made a recommendation for prosecution to his superior 5 If
the subpoena was issued prior to this initial recommendation for prosecu-
tion, the fact that the special agent issued the subpoena is not determina-
tive of sole criminal investigative purpose.96
Significantly, Justice Douglas's concurring opinion in Donaldson
makes a strong argument that the moment a special agent is assigned
to the case (which only happens in the event of an allegation or indica-
tion of criminal conduct), the IRS clearly begins conducting a criminal
investigation. Justice Douglas maintained that procedural due process
requires that the subject of the investigation be allowed to confront and
examine the IRS when it meets with the third party to examine the
records since criminal sanctions are involved.9 7 Of course, such a right
within the law as it now exists would be illusory since a major conse-
quence of the denial of proprietary rights in information held by third
parties is that the taxpayer is denied notice of the investigation and sub-
poena of this information. Thus, the exercise of a right to be present
at the meeting between the IRS and the third party would wholly
depend upon the willingness of the third party to give notice. The Tax
Reform Act would ameliorate this difficulty in one respect: the IRS
would be required to notify the taxpayer of subpoenas issued to third
parties 9 8 in addition to granting the taxpayer a right to intervene in
the enforcement proceedingf 9 It should be noted that the act does
not provide that the taxpayer has the right to be present at the actual
meeting between the bank and the IRS. There seems to be no good
reason why the taxpayer should not be afforded this opportunity.
Under the Tax Reform Act the taxpayer would have to present his chal-
lenges at the enforcement proceeding, which would take place prior
to the actual flow of information. Assuming the subpoena were
upheld, the taxpayer would still have to rely on a bank official not to
disclose incidentally additional information which might be subject to
successful challenge if the taxpayer were to assert his rights. To give
the taxpayer the option of appearing at the meeting where actual dis-
closure occurs, or at least a right to prior inspection of the materials
to be produced, would ensure that only judicially approved information
would be disclosed to the IRS. 100
95. See, e.g., United States v. Northwestern Pa. Bank & Trust Co., 355 F. Supp.
607 (W.D. Pa. 1973) (intervention allowed where a recommendation for prosecution
was shown).
96. See, e.g., United States v. Fisher, 74-2 U.S. Tax Cas. 9512 (3d Cir. 1974);
United States v. Machtinger, 71-1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9493 (C.D. Ca. 1971). See also
Tillotson v. Boughner, 333 F.2d 515 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 913 (1964)
(subpoena issued by a special agent).
97. 400 U.S. at 537-38.
98. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., lst Sess. § 1211(b)(1) (1975).
99. Id.
100. Absent specific legislative authorization, it is doubtful that courts will grant the
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Taxpayer Injunctions To Prevent Compliance with Subpoenas
Substantive Challenges to Administrative Subpoenas
As previously discussed, the Tax Reform Act would provide that
a depositor could compel an enforcement hearing to determine the
validity of an administrative subpoena by instructing his bank not to
comply voluntarily with the subpoena. 10 1 This section examines a
depositor's present ability to enjoin bank compliance in order to indi-
cate the importance of this proposed change in procedure.
In light of Donaldson, which denied taxpayers standing to inter-
vene in enforcement proceedings where the subpoena is directed at
third parties, taxpayers have attempted to prevent government access by
bringing a separate action in the district court to enjoin the bank from
complying with, or the IRS from using, an administrative subpoena.
With respect to injunctions against the IRS in particular, several
recent cases have disallowed such actions on the basis that a remedy
at law exists through intervention in judicial proceedings brought by the
IRS to enforce its subpoena.'02 These courts relied on language in a
case prior to Donaldson that indicated in dictum that a taxpayer can
intervene in such an enforcement hearing, or at least restrain the third
party from compliance with the subpoena until an enforcement proceed-
ing is initiated. 0 3 Donaldson, of course, denied taxpayers an absolute
intervention right, allowing only permissive intervention when a signi-
ficantly protectable interest could be shown. 04 In spite of Donaldson,
however, some courts continue to dismiss requests for injunctions against
the IRS with instructions that the taxpayer first enjoin the bank (or
other third party) from complying with the subpoena, and later inter-
vene in the subsequent enforcement proceeding. 10 5
taxpayer this right. In one case, a district court granted a taxpayer's petition to
intervene but limited the scope of the order to permit the taxpayer only to be present at
the bank's appearance before the IRS agent. The court of appeals reversed, holding that
under Donaldson the taxpayer's interests would not support intervention of right, and
that discretionary intervention should not be allowed either. Thus, surveillance privi-
leges were inappropriate. Noting that the taxpayer could always assert any interest he
might have at a subsequent trial, the court commented that the complex structure of
government would be frustrated if private persons were allowed to take an active part
through private counsel in such proceedings. United States v. Newman, 441 F.2d 165,
174 (5th Cir. 1971).
101. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1211(b) (2).
102. See Kelley v. United States, 503 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974); Cook v. United
States, 387 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (D. Nev. 1974); Fitzmartin v. Bingler, 244 F. Supp. 541
(W.D. Pa. 1965).
103. See Reisman v. Caplin, 375 U.S. 440 (1964).
104. 400 U.S. at 530-31.
105. In Kelley v. United States, 503 F.2d 93 (9th Cir. 1974), the court apparently
qoncludes that taxpayer could present sufficient interests to support a claim for interven-
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Taxpayers, however, have had differing success in enjoining bank
compliance. In Bowser v. First National Bank,10 6 a federal district
court granted a permanent injunction against a bank where it had pre-
viously dismissed an action to enjoin the IRS with the stipulation that
the taxpayer be allowed to assert his reasons why the subpoena should
not be obeyed to the IRS agent receiving the information. The court
indicated that when the agent rejected the taxpayer's defenses, the tax-
payer should request his bank not to comply and the matter would be
relitigated at an enforcement hearing. The court was apparently either
ignoring the intervention difficulties facing the taxpayer since Donald-
son, or it was assuming that the bank would honor the taxpayer's
request and challenge the subpoena. When, however, the government
failed to pursue the matter, the court permanently enjoined the bank's
disclosure.
In Cook v. United States,'0 7 however, a court refused to enjoin
a bank and credit union from disclosing information to the IRS. The
court first reviewed the decisions which held that a depositor does not
have a protectable interest in his bank records. 0 8  Concluding that the
plaintiff's constitutional claims would fail to grant him standing to inter-
vene under the Donaldson criteria, the court concluded that even if it
did enjoin the bank's compliance, the IRS would simply instigate an
enforcement hearing. The taxpayer would then have to attempt to
intervene and the law is clear that he would have no standing:
Thus, to grant the relief sought would frustrate both judicial econ-
omy and the taxpayer's own interests, for it would only lead to
further costly and time consuming litigation in which the taxpayer
has no chance of success. 10 9
The Tax Reform Act would give the taxpayer the right to instruct
his bank not to comply voluntarily with an IRS subpoena. An enforce-
ment proceeding would then ensue at which time defenses to the sub-
poena could be heard. The act would thus circumvent the restrictive
Donaldson criteria by specifically providing that taxpayers may inter-
vene in the action.
tion. In Kirschenbaum v. Beerman, 376 F. Supp. 398 (W.D. Pa. 1974), the court notes
that the adequate legal remedy of intervention may be hollow in practical reality since
banks rarely contest administrative subpoenas. Another case makes the further point
that even if a bank does contest the subpoena, the taxpayer faces serious intervention
difficulties under Donaldson. Cook v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 1100, 1102 (D. Nev.
1974).
106. 390 F. Supp. 834 (D. Md. 1975).
107. Cook v. United States, 387 F. Supp. 1103 (D. Nev. 1974).
108. See, e.g., California Bankers Ass'n v. Shultz, 416 U.S. 21 (1974); Couch v.
United States, 409 U.S. 322, 326 (1973); Donaldson v. United States, 400 U.S. 517, 522-
23 (1971).
109. 387 F. Supp. at 1110 (D. Nev. 1974).
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Substantive Challenges to Administrative Subpoenas
Challenges by the Bank
The defenses available to a bank wishing to defeat IRS access to
customer records are of paramount importance under present law
because the depositor is generally denied the opportunity to intervene
at the enforcement hearing. These defenses will remain important
under the Tax Reform Act as well, since the act will not affect the
bank's ability to challenge the subpoena on its own.
Various defenses have proved capable of defeating the subpoena
in enforcement actions by the IRS. A bank can defeat a subpoena by
showing that it was issued for an unauthorized purpose,"' or otherwise
violates a provision of the Internal Revenue Code,"' such as the gen-
eral prohibition against second examinations of records already once
subjected to IRS scrutiny."" Other ad hoc defenses have also been
made by banks to curtail government access to their records," 3 but the
110. Section 7602 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 authorizes use of the
subpoena power only for the purpose of ascertaining the accuracy of a tax return which
has been filed or ascertaining whether a return should have been filed but was not. An
administrative subpoena is unenforceable where its purpose is found to be outside the
scope of this grant of power. See, e.g., United States v. Weingarden, 473 F.2d 454 (6th
Cir. 1973) (aiding in the investigation of evidence for use in a criminal prosecution);
McDonough v. Lambert, 94 F.2d 838 (1st Cir. 1938) (certifying a return or determining
the tax liability of an unknown person); Pacific Mills v. Kenefick, 99 F.2d 188 (1st Cir.
1938) (aiding in the government's defense of a civil income tax refund suit); United
States v. O'Connor, 118 F. Supp. 248 (D. Mass. 1953) (aiding the work of other
governmental agencies).
111. See, e.g., INT. Rav. CODE OF 1954, § 7605(a) (regarding time, place and
manner of production); id. § 6501 (regarding statute of limitations); id. § 7605(b) (re-
garding second examinations).
112. Section 7605(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1954 provides that no
taxpayer shall be subjected to unnecessary investigations or examinations. Only one
inspection of a taxpayer's books can be made for each taxable year unless the taxpayer
requests otherwise or the IRS notifies the taxpayer in writing that another examination is
necessary. However the statute by its terms only applies to the books and records of the
taxpayer. Thus it has been held that a taxpayer has no standing to object to an
examination of the books and records of third parties such as banks even though no
notice was given. See United States v. Howard, 360 F.2d 373 (3d Cir. 1966);
DeMasters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79 (9th Cir. 1963). The third party, however, can raise
the objection that a second examination of his books is unnecessary. See Martin v.
Chandis Securities Co., 128 F.2d 731 (9th Cir. 1942). It is unclear whether the
taxpayer would be able to raise this objection for the bank under the Tax Reform Act.
113. A recent case indicates that banks may be protected by the due process clause
against undue expense in complying with an administrative subpoena. See United States
v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 397 F. Supp. 418 (C.D. Cal. 1975). It has traditionally
been asserted that copying costs are reasonable and necessary expenses of doing business.
See United States v. Bremicker, 365 F. Supp. 701 (D. Minn. 1973); United States ex rel.
Sathre v. Third Northwestern Nat'l Bank, 102 F. Supp. 879 (D. Minn. 1952). However,
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most significant protection lies in the fourth amendment's guarantee
against unreasonable search and seizure.
The fourth amendment seems to be a particularly appropriate
defense to an administrative subpoena which is issued without a court's
approval. However, the proscription in that amendment relates only
to "unreasonable" searches and seizures; therefore, challenges on this
ground usually have the effect of only narrowing the subpoena to one
that is "reasonable." 114  Only overly broad demands for information
which lack any indication that the records will bear on the tax liability
of the named taxpayer have resulted in the quashing of an IRS
subpoena." 5
For example, in First National Bank v. United States,1 6 the
in Farmers & Merchants Bank, the court ordered the IRS to absorb a $2500 bill for the
bank's costs in complying with an administrative subpoena. Noting that the statute
(INT. REV. CODE OF 1954, § 7602) is silent on the issue of reimbursement, the court said
that to force the bank to absorb more than nominal costs in aiding government
investigation of a third party amounts to an unreasonable deprivation of property without
due process of law. United States v. Farmers & Merchants Bank, 397 F. Supp. 418
(C.D. Ca. 1975).
Several banks have made the unsuccessful argument that absent a court order,
disclosure pursuant to an IRS subpoena violates the provisions of the Fair Credit
Reporting Act of 1971, 15 U.S.C. § 1681. See, e.g., United States v. First Nat'l Bank,
35 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 75-1129 (D. Ariz. 1975); United States v. Lake County Nat'l
Bank, 35 Am. Fed. Tax R.2d 75-1428 (N.D. Ohio 1975); United States v. Puntorieri, 75-
1 U.S. Tax Cas. 9382 (E.D.N.Y. 1974); United States v. Valley Bank, 74-1 U.S. Tax.
Cas. 9395 (D. Idaho 1974); United States v. Bremicker, 365 F. Supp. 701 (D. Minn.
1973). The argument is that Section 1681f of the Fair Credit Reporting Act, which
deals with disclosure to government agencies, provides that absent a court order, the
customer's consent, or a permissible purpose, a consumer reporting agency can furnish
"identifying information respecting any consumer limited to his name, address, former
addresses, place of employment and former places of employment .... ." [emphasis
added]. Banks therefore argue that they are legally constrained from supplying anything
besides the "identifying information" absent a court order. This argument contains
several definitional problems, namely whether a bank is a "consumer reporting agency"
and whether the information sought is a "consumer report" within the meaning of the
act. To date the courts have rejected this argument, saying that the Fair Credit
Reporting Act was not designed to apply to IRS investigations, and further that bank
records are not "consumer reports." See LaValley & Lancy, The IRS Summons and the
Duty of Confidentiality: A Hobson's Choice for Bankers, 89 BANKING L.J. 979 (1972).
114. See, e.g., United States v. Matras, 487 F.2d 1271 (8th Cir. 1973); United
States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973); United States v. Prichard, 438 F.2d
969 (5th Cir. 1971); United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129 (3d Cir.
1967); First Nat'l Bank of Mobile v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947).
115. See, e.g., United States v. Harrington, 88 F.2d 520 (2d Cir. 1968); United
States v. Armour, 376 F. Supp. 318 (D. Conn. 1974); United States v. Sun First Nat'l
Bank of Orlando, 374 F. Supp. 1120 (M.D. Fla. 1974), aff'd, 510 F.2d 1107 (5th Cir.),
cert. denied, 423 U.S. 927 (1975); United States v. First Nat'l Bank, 173 F. Supp. 716
(W.D. Ark. 1959).
116. 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947).
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United States Court of Appeal for the Fifth Circuit modified an
enforcement order which had called for bank production of all its
records with respect to certain types of transactions, including the issu-
ance of cashier's checks and drafts on other banks, in order that the
IRS might pick out transactions between the bank and the particular
taxpayer under investigation. The Fifth Circuit stated that the IRS
must first determine what relevant papers were within the bank's
possession by interrogating an officer of the bank under oath. Only
the papers relevant to the particular taxpayer under investigation could
be subject to the enforcement order.
Similarly, in United States ex rel. Sathre v. Third Northwestern
National Bank,117 a federal district court declined to enforce a subpoena
directing production of bank records for transactions with certain
named persons where the bank showed that the taxpayer had not dealt
recently with it, except with respect to a car loan about which informa-
tion had been supplied to the IRS pursuant to a prior subpoena. The
IRS contended that the individuals named in the subpoena might have
engaged in other transactions with the bank under assumed names or
through agents and that, therefore, broad access to bank records was
necessary. Noting that the bank would have to examine 58,577 items,
which would consume three to four working days of three to four bank
employees, the court stated that such an extraordinary performance by
the bank would only be reasonable if there were some evidence that
some of the documents would bear on the tax liability of the taxpayer.
The subpoena was therefore held to be unreasonable since it compelled
production out of proportion to the end sought.
Another possible ground for challenge to an administrative
subpoena might be the existence of a "banker's privilege," but no court
has recognized any such confidential relationship between banker and
depositor.""8 This has an anomalous effect where the subpoena is
directed to a bank requesting production of an attorney's bank records
with a view towards discovering information regarding that attorney's
client. The lack of a confidential relationship between the attorney and
the bank precludes assertion of the privilege." 9 Thus, the IRS can
often get indirectly what it cannot get directly: a subpoena on the attor-
ney may fail because of a claim of privilege, but if the desired informa-
tion was incidentally disclosed by the attorney to his bank, a subpoena
on the bank will prove fruitful. Indeed, this tactic has been used
successfully. 20 Moreover, legal ethics force an attorney to play into
117. 102 F. Supp. 879 (D. Minn. 1952).
118. See, e.g., United States v. Bremicker, 365 F. Supp. 701 (D. Minn. 1973).
119. See, e.g., Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969). See notes
129-33 & accompanying text infra.
120. See, e.g., Tillotson v. Boughner, 350 F.2d 663 (7th Cir. 1965) where a
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the hands of the IRS agent seeking the records of that attorney's client.
An attorney is required by law to maintain a separate trust account
for all funds held on behalf of his client. 2 ' However, in doing so, the
attorney negates the attorney-client privilege as to that information.
Even if the information is not of a privileged nature, the attorney has
at the very least conveniently pigeonholed his client's financial data,
facilitating expeditious government access. The courts have not yet
addressed this problem.122
Challenges by the Depositor-Taxpayer
If the Tax Reform Act becomes law, a depositor will be able to
intervene at an administrative subpoena enforcement proceeding and
present his defenses to the subpoena. It should be noted, however,
that the effect of the Tax Reform Act is to separate the issue of inter-
vention from the issue of the validity of a taxpayer's defenses to a sub-
poena. This distinction has never been clear in the case law. For
example, in Donaldson the Court appeared to hold that a right to inter-
vention will not generally lie since the taxpayer lacks what are in effect
fourth amendment interests: proprietary interests, ownership, or
possession.' 23  But where the court can find an acceptable substantive
defense, such as a sole criminal purpose behind the subpoena, it will
permit intervention so that the defense can be raised.12 4  Lower courts
presented with petitions for intervention thus found themselves in the
position of having to determine whether, if intervention were granted,
the taxpayer would have a viable substantive challenge to assert. If
he did not, intervention would be denied.'25 This put the prospective
intervenor at the disadvantage of having to prove his case merely to
establish the right to assert his claim.
The Tax Reform Act affords the taxpayer the absolute right to
intervene but it specifically does not change existing law on the sub-
subpoenaed attorney's claim of privilege was upheld. The attorney had delivered a check
to the IRS on behalf of an unnamed taxpayer whom the service wanted the attorney to
identify. However, the client had initiated the tax payment by writing a check to his
attorney who had in turn deposited it in the bank. The records of this deposit were held
to be subject to IRS subpoena in Schulze v. Rayunec, 350 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1965) and
the IRS ended up with a copy of the client's check.
121. See, e.g., CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 6076, Rule 8-101 (West Supp. 1975)
(Rules of Professional Conduct).
122. A collateral problem alluded to above may well prevent its direct considera-
tion. It has been held that cancelled checks and bank statements, as negotiable
instruments in commerce, are not confidential material since they are disclosed to a third
party, that is, the bank. See Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969).
Therefore, it may be found that the attorney-client privilege has been waived.
123. 400 U.S. 517, 523 (1971).
124. Id. at 530.
125. United States v. Union Nat'l Bank, 363 F. Supp. 629 (W.D. Pa. 1973).
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stantive defenses available to a taxpayer.'26 The legislative history
accompanying the Tax Reform Act indicates that certain defenses tradi-
tionally only available to the third party will also be available to inter-
venors. 2 7 Thus, the taxpayer would be able to challenge the subpoena
if it does not conform to technical requirements, i.e., is vague, ambigu-
ous, overbroad, or requires production of materials irrelevant to the
investigation. The taxpayer will not have to rely on his bank, whose
interests are not greatly affected, to challenge a subpoena. But
beyond these, a taxpayer will be limited in the objections he can raise.
In particular, constitutional defenses will not be available to him. For
instance, fifth amendment rights have always been considered personal.
The depositor, lacking a proprietary interest in records compiled and
possessed by his bank, or a confidential relationship with the bank
which would entitle him to a reasonable expectation of privacy as to
the records, is defeated in his fifth amendment claim for the same
reason the bank would fail if it asserted the claim on the taxpayer's
behalf: no privilege protects a person from incrimination by the
records of another.128
Two recent Supreme Court cases have further dashed any hopes
of a fifth amendment defense by an intervening depositor. In Fisher
v. United States, 29 the Supreme Court adopted a restrictive view of
the fifth amendment privilege claimed by a taxpayer's attorney where
the IRS subpoenaed documents regarding preparation of tax returns.
The particular facts before the Court in Fisher involved materials which
had initially been in the possession of the taxpayer's accountant but
were subsequently transferred to an attorney during the course of an
IRS investigation to aid in preparing the taxpayer's defense. The
Supreme Court overruled the attorney's claim of fifth amendment
privilege made on behalf of his client on grounds which emphasized
the necessity for testimonial compulsion of the taxpayer himself. The
Court held that to require the attorney to produce documents does not
implicate any fifth amendment privilege the taxpayer may have enjoyed
from being himself compelled to produce the papers; 30 the fact that
the attorney was an agent of the taxpayer does not change this result.' 3 '
The Court further held that notwithstanding the taxpayer's reasonable
expectation of privacy with regard to the records, the fifth amendment
126. H.R. 10612, 94thCong., lstSess. § 1211(b)(1) (1975).
127. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1975).
128. See United States v. Continental Bank & Trust Co., 503 F.2d 45 (10th Cir.
1974); United States v. White, 477 F.2d 757 (5th Cir. 1973), cert. denied, 419 U.S. 872
(1974); Harris v. United States, 413 F.2d 316 (9th Cir. 1969).
129. 96 S. Ct. 1569 (1976).
130. Id. at 1574.
131. Id.
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is not a privacy amendment and does not protect private information
obtained without compelling self-incriminating testimony. 132  In a
sweeping ruling covering the scope of fifth amendment guarantees, the
Court stated that the fifth amendment would not even protect the tax-
payer himself from producing the papers since the fifth amendment
applies only to testimonial compulsion and the act of producing the
papers is not testimonial.'1 3  This prediction was borne out in
Andresen v. Maryland,13 4 where the Supreme Court ruled that personal
records are not by themselves protected by the fifth amendment and
can be used as evidence. The Court, however, did preserve some fifth
amendment protection for the personal recordholder but it promises to
be hollow protection indeed. It held that issuing him a subpoena and
asking him to collect his records himself was impermissible compulsion
of testimony. On the other hand, police with a valid search warrant
could search for the records since in such a case the recordholder would
not be compelled to do anything.' 3 5
The implication of these decisions with regard to bank-held
information seems clear: if the focus is now on the testimonial
elements of production, rather than on the content of the evidence,
neither the bank nor the taxpayer will be successful in claiming a fifth
amendment privilege.
Neither does any successful defense seem to lie in the fourth
amendment's guarantee against unreasonable search and seizure. Un-
der a narrow property orientation, possession or ownership is a pre-
requisite to a fourth amendment claim. 36 Since a depositor lacks
possession or ownership of his bank records, he traditionally lacks
standing to advance the fourth amendment with regard to search and
seizure of those records.' 3 7  Moreover, any claim of expectation of
privacy protected by the fourth amendment 138 has been foreclosed by
132. Id. at 1576.
133. Id. at 1580-81. In his concurring opinion, Justice Marshall suggests that
where there is some doubt as to the existence of the papers, their production might be
considered testimonial to the extent of validating their existence. However, this ap-
proach would not render production of bank records testimonial since their existence is
rarely in doubt. Id. at 1591.
134. 44 U.S.L.W. 5125 (U.S. June 29, 1976).
135. Id. at 5128-29.
136. See Alderman v. United States, 394 U.S. 165, 176-77 (1969); Jones v. United
States, 362 U.S. 257, 266 (1960); Johnson v. United States, 333 U.S. 10 (1948);
Grainger v. United States, 158 F.2d 236 (4th Cir. 1946); MacDaniel v. United States,
294 F. 768 (6th Cir.), cert. denied, 264 U.S. 593 (1924).
137. See Application of Cole, 342 F.2d 518 (2d Cir.), cert. denied, 381 U.S. 950
(1965); DeMasters v. Arend, 313 F.2d 79, 85 (9th Cir.), petition for cert. dismissed,
375 U.S. 936 (1963); In re Upham's Income Tax, 18 F. Supp. 737, 738 (S.D.N.Y.
1937).
138. See Katz v. United States, 389 U.S. 347 (1967). See note 64 & accompanying
text supra.
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United States v. Miller.139 The legislative history of the Tax Reform
Act includes overbreadth and irrelevance in the list of defenses tradi-
tionally only available to a third party but intended to be made avail-
able to the taxpayer.140  To the extent that these concepts are included
in judicial application of the fourth amendment, the taxpayer would
enjoy quasi-fourth amendment rights in third party records.
United States v. Bisceglia: John Doe Subpoenas
Prior to the Supreme Court's decision in United States v. Bisceg-
lia,41 it was doubtful whether the Internal Revenue Service had the
authority to issue a subpoena to compel production of records possessed
by a third party where no specific individual's tax liability was in ques-
tion. When the IRS, hoping to discover potential tax liability, sought
third party materials pertaining to a group of otherwise unidentified
persons, the courts were careful to ensure that investigation of a par-
ticular taxpayer, and not a sweeping exploratory search, was the object
of the subpoena.1 42  However, "John Doe" subpoenas were considered
appropriate and enforceable if the IRS could demonstrate that the
investigation related to a particular, ascertainable taxpayer whose name
was simply unknown. 141
In United States v. Bisceglia,144 the Supreme Court considered
whether the IRS has statutory authority to issue a John Doe subpoena
to a bank or other third party to discover the identity to an unknown
139. 96 S. Ct. 1619 (1976). See notes 63-65 & accompanying text supra.
140. H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 309 (1975).
141. 420 U.S. 141 (1975).
142. See United States v. Theodore, 479 F.2d 749 (4th Cir. 1973); Mays v. Davis,
7 F. Supp. 596 (W.D. Pa. 1934) (decided under a predecessor of Internal Revenue Code
§ 7602); accord, United States v. Dauphin Deposit Trust Co., 385 F.2d 129 (3d Cir.
1967); Teamsters Local 174 v. United States, 240 F.2d 387 (9th Cir. 1956); First Nat'l
Bank v. United States, 160 F.2d 532 (5th Cir. 1947); McDonough v. Lambert, 94 F.2d
838 (1st Cir. 1938). Contra, United States v. Carter, 89 F.2d 413 (5th Cir. 1973);
United States v. Berkowitz, 488 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v. Turner,
480 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1973).
143. See Tillotson v. Boughner, 333 F.2d 515 (7th Cir.), cert. denied, 379 U.S. 913
(1964); Schulze v. Rayunec, 350 F.2d 666 (7th Cir. 1965). In these cases, the IRS
sought enforcement of a section 7602 subpoena issued to an attorney and a bank during
an investigation in which the IRS sought the identity of a person for whom the attorney
had obtained a large cashier's check. The attorney had sent the check to the IRS with a
letter saying that the check was for unpaid taxes owed by an anonymous person. The
IRS sought the name of the taxpayer from the attorney, whose claim of privilege was
upheld in the former case, and from the bank, which was ultimately ordered to disclose
the identity of the taxpayer. See also United States v. Carter, 489 F.2d 413 (5th Cir.
1973); United States v. Berkowitz, 488 F.2d 1235 (3d Cir. 1973); United States v.
Turner, 480 F.2d 272 (7th Cir. 1973).
144. 420 U.S. 141 (1975), rev'g 486 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1973).
September 1976] IRS ACCESS TO BANK RECORDS
and unascertained person who had engaged in transactions suggesting
the possibility of liability for unpaid taxes. In Bisceglia, a bank
received two separate deposits, each of which included $20,000 in
$100 bills showing signs of severe disintegration, possibly caused by a
long period of storage. These extraordinary facts led the IRS to sus-
pect that the transactions relating to these deposits might not have been
reported for tax purposes. The agent assigned to the case issued a
John Doe administrative subpoena to the bank calling for production
of
[t]hose books and records which will provide information as to the
person(s) or firm(s) which deposited, redeemed or otherwise gave
to the Commercial Bank $100 bills U.S. Currency which the Com-
mercial Bank sent in two shipments of (200) two hundred each
$100 bills to the Cincinnati Branch of the Federal Reserve Bank
on or about November 6, 1970 and November 16, 1970.14
The bank refused to comply and the agent instituted an enforce-
ment proceeding in the district court. The court narrowed slightly the
scope of the subpoena and ordered the bank to comply. The Sixth
Circuit reversed, holding that section 7602 of the Internal Revenue
Code requires the IRS to have already identified the taxpayer in ques-
tion. 14 6  The Supreme Court, however, agreed with the district
court that section 7602 permits John Doe subpoenas and ordered
compliance. 147
The Bisceglia majority held that section 7602 of the Internal
Revenue Code permitted broad investigatory authority necessary in a
system of self-reporting of tax liability. The Bank Secrecy Act 4 ' was
taken to mean that the government, in enforcing the tax laws, has a
legitimate interest in obtaining information on large financial transac-
tions. According to the Court, if the IRS were unable to follow up
information obtained unless the identity of the taxpayer was known, a
meaningful investigation could not be made, thereby violating the pur-
poses of the Bank Secrecy Act. 14 9 The Court felt that the subpoenaed
party is protected from abuse of authority by section 7604 of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, which provides that IRS subpoenas can only be
145. Id. at 143.
146. 486 F.2d 706 (6th Cir. 1973).
147. 420 U.S. 141 (1975).
148. See notes 6-10 & accompanying text supra.
149. 420 U.S. at 145-46. The dissenting Justices in Bisceglia adopted a "protective"
construction of the Bank Secrecy Act, arguing that Congress has always restricted the
scope of the subpoena power, while at the same time writing "special purpose" statutes to
require the reporting of certain kinds of transactions deemed of particular importance to
the "sound administration of the tax system." Id. at 154. This attitude is untenable
given the broad statement of purpose of the Bank Secrecy Act and the extensive
recordkeeping requirements not limited to those transactions which must be reported.
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enforced by the courts. District courts take seriously their obligation to
scrutinize administrative subpoenas, the Court said, noting that the
scope of the Bisceglia subpoena had been narrowed in district court
proceedings. 50 Thus, for the Bisceglia Court, both the aim and proce-
dure of John Doe subpoenas passed constitutional muster.
Justices Blackmum and Powell qualified their agreement with the
majority by emphasizing the probability that in this case one individual
or entity was responsible for the deposits. They stated that a John Doe
subpoena might not be enforceable where neither a particular taxpayer
nor a group of taxpayers was under investigation. 151
Justices Stewart and Douglas, however, dissented on the ground
that while the IRS has broad investigatory duties, its subpoena power
is statutorily restricted to the "particular purposes of individual investi-
gation."' 52  The dissenting justices accused the majority of extending
the subpoena power to equal the scope of the investigatory power and
argued that the Court was allowing "enforcement of a summons having
no investigative predicate . . . [a] breathtaking expansion of the sum-
mons power . ... "I The dissenters then examined the judicial
precedent and concluded:
When, as here, the third-party summons does not identify the party
under investigation, a presumption naturally arises that the sum-
mons is not genuinely investigative but merely exploratory-a de-
vice for general research or for the hit-or-miss monitoring of "un-
usual" transactions. Unless this presumption is rebutted by the
Service, the courts have denied enforcement.154
Thus, the majority opinion in Bisceglia recognizes the need for
broad IRS investigatory powers. 55 But it does not recognize the con-
verse proposition: that a taxpayer-depositor needs to be able to protect
himself against the exercise of that broad investigatory power. The
dissent, however, recognizes the taxpayer's right to this protection and
therefore finds deficient the existing subpoena procedures which. con-
template only the protection of the subpoenaed party. The dissent
would require the IRS to make a demonstration that it seeks third party
records pertaining to the tax liability of a particular taxpayer in whom
it is interested. This, then, could have been the "measurable standard"
with which the courts must scrutinize subpoenas, in order to make cer-
tain that they are reasonable and not an abuse of authority in an
150. Id. at 146-47.
151. Id. at 151-52.
152. Id. at 155.
153. Id. at 156-57.
154. Id. at 157.
155. The majority opinion commented that broad powers to subpoena third party
information are necessary since "[fliduciaries and other agents are understandably
reluctant to disclose information regarding their principles." Id. at 150.
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economy where large numbers of transactions are potentially tax rele-
vant. 56 Thus, the dissent goes beyond the rhetoric that states that
administrative subpoena procedure satisfies due process merely be-
cause it allows an adversary hearing at some point. A hearing is no
protection at all unless a standard against which to judge the subpoena
is offered.
It is too early to know what impact Bisceglia will have on the lower
courts. One case has been decided by a United States court of appeals
in accordance with a Supreme Court order for reconsideration in light
of Bisceglia. In United States v. Humble Oil & Refining Co.,157 the
Fifth Circuit had denied enforcement of an IRS subpoena which sought
the identities of lessors of mineral rights to whom the oil company had
surrendered expired mineral leases without having extracted any
minerals, in order to determine whether the lessors had remembered
to restore in their most recent tax returns the depletion allowances
which they had claimed during the life of the lease. The IRS admitted
that it had neither the oil company nor any particular lessor, lease, or
land under investigation. The court of appeals held that the IRS could
not use its subpoena power as a tool for research. It distinguished the
power to make inquiries and the power to subpoena information, noting
that the power to make inquiries can be applied "rather cavalierly,"
while, as to the subpoena power: "there must be some nexus between
information sought and a specific investigation of specific individuals
before the government can compel third parties, at their own expense,
to give information to the Internal Revenue Service."' 58
On reconsideration, the Fifth Circuit still refused to enforce the
subpoena. Bisceglia was distinguished on the ground that the extra-
ordinary transaction there gave rise to a strong suspicion of unpaid taxes
by some individual. Here, the court said, there were no factually
demonstrable grounds to suggest the likelihood of unpaid taxes.
Rather, the IRS simply sought information regarding compliance with
the Internal Revenue Code. 15 9
In summary, the case law now seems to suggest that exploratory
subpoenas are permissible so long as they relate to a definite tax
liability, but impermissible if merely for general research. Does this
mean that if the IRS in Humble Oil had alleged that statistics showed
a history of noncompliance with the recoupment provision of the Inter-
nal Revenue Code, enforcement would have been granted since, in the
156. Id. at 155.
157. 488 F.2d 953 (5th Cir. 1974), af'g 346 F. Supp. 944 (S.D. Tex. 1972),
vacated, 421 U.S. 943, af'd, 518 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1975).
158. 488 F.2d 953, 960 (5th Cir. 1974), citing 346 F. Supp. 944, 947 (S.D. Tex.
1972).
159. 518 F.2d 747 (5th Cir. 1975).
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language of the Bisceglia Court, a reasonably well-defined group of tax-
payers' tax liability was in question? At present, this question is
unanswerable. The extent to which Bisceglia will be applied or dis-
tinguished will be up to the lower courts. If those courts wish, Bisceg-
lia certainly provides a foundation for very broad expansion of the IRS
subpoena power. However, given the caveat in the concurring opinion
which indicated that on its face Bisceglia was an easy case, 160 it is
possible that Bisceglia may have little practical effect on subsequent
decisions.
The Tax Reform Act contains a specific provision regarding IRS
use of John Doe subpoenas.' 6 ' The act would specifically delegate the
power to use John Doe subpoenas to the IRS, but it would also incor-
porate protections for the taxpayer under investigation. The act would
provide that a subpoena which does not identify the taxpayer in ques-
tion can be served only after a court hearing at which the secretary of
the treasury (or his delegate) establishes:
1) that there is reasonable cause to believe that there has
been a transaction affecting the liability for tax of a person;
2) that there is reasonable cause to believe that this trans-
action has not, or is likely not to be correctly reported; and
3) that other sources of information with respect to this
transaction (or with respect to the identity of the taxpayer
or taxpayers involved in the transaction) are not readily avail-
able. 162
The apparent intent of these provisions is to preserve the John
Doe subpoena for use by the IRS in situations where there are unusual
and suspicious circumstances about which the IRS needs to learn more
details in order to determine whether and for whom there is tax liabil-
ity. Thus, in a fact situation like that of Bisceglia or where, for
example, an accountant has filed a John and Mary Doe tax return, the
above procedure would permit use of the John Doe subpoena but only
after court approval. However, the service would still not need to show
probable cause (as defined with regard to issuance of a search warrant)
that a criminal act has occurred or that civil fraud might be involved.163
It would be enough for the IRS to reveal evidence that a transaction
is reasonably suggestive of an unreported tax liability, and that the ser-
vice has made a good faith effort to obtain the information through
means other than a John Doe subpoena.6 But the Tax Reform Act
160. See 420 U.S. 141, 151 (1975).
161. H.R. 10612, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. § 1211(f) (1975).
162. Id.
163. Id.; cf. United States v. Powell, 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
164. See H.R. REP. No. 94-658, 94th Cong., 1st Sess. 311 (1975).
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would ensure judicial supervision over the use of John Doe subpoenas
before these potent weapons are put to use.
Significantly, the above standard short of probable cause is
substantially the same as standards put forth by the Supreme Court in
United States v. Powel1156 as to a subpoena directly against a named
taxpayer as distinct from a John Doe subpoena against a third party
recordholder. In Powell the taxpayer was subpoenaed to appear
before an IRS agent with regard to tax liability for a period longer than
three years prior to the date of the subpoena. The taxpayer challenged
the subpoena on the ground that the Internal Revenue Code bars addi-
tional deficiency assessments after three years unless fraud is shown,
and he demanded to know the service's grounds for a belief that fraud
had occurred. He contended that the statute required the service to
prove facts showing that the agent's suspicion of fraud was reasonable.
This would, of course, require the agent to disclose the source of his
suspicion, which the service would rather not do. The IRS claimed that
it need only show it had reason to suspect that the taxpayer had filed
false or fraudulent returns. The Supreme Court held that, indeed, the
service need not make a showing of probable cause in investigations
either before or after the running of the statute of limitations, since such
a requirement "might seriously hamper the Commissioner in carrying
out investigations he thinks warranted, forcing him to litigate and prose-
cute appeals on the very subject which he desires to investigate .... "16'
All that is required of the commissioner is that he show that the investi-
gation is conducted pursuant to a legitimate purpose, that the informa-
tion sought is relevant, that the information sought is not already within
the commissioner's possession, and that the administrative steps re-
quired by the code have been followed.'6 7
The Tax Reform Act would impose similar restraints on the use
of John Doe subpoenas.' 68 Since no taxpayer is named and since the
third party, lacking a substantial interest in protecting the information,
is unlikely to go to the expense and trouble of contesting such a
subpoena, this section of the Tax Reform Act would provide for a
mandatory court hearing to determine whether a fair usage of the sub-
poena power is being made. The same requirements would be placed
on the commissioner with regard to John Doe subpoenas as are imposed
with regard to subpoenas directed to a named taxpayer.
165. 379 U.S. 48 (1964).
166. Id. at 54.
167. Id. at 57-58. The rule in Powell still leaves the taxpayer free to object that
enforcement of the subpoena would be an abuse of the court's process. However, the
taxpayer must base this contention on more than merely an expired statute of limitations.
Id.
168. See note 162 & accompanying text supra.
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Conclusion
Ours is a highly computerized society, in which third party
institutions, such as banks, telephone companies, hospitals, and credit
bureaus maintain vast quantities of personal information, the scope of
which often exceeds that maintained by the individual himself. In a
time of concern over excessive governmental power, we should recog-
nize that government access to these vast repositories of personal infor-
mation is not adequately restricted. Traditional legal doctrines are
simply inadequate to cope with the modern notions of person and prop-
erty. While the Supreme Court has left behind the technicalities of
property law and has charted a broad new construction of fourth
amendment interests based on "expectations of privacy" in some areas,
this source of personal rights has been denied bank customers in con-
nection with the government's use of administrative subpoenas. The
Tax Reform Act would take legislative initiative in this area and in the
context of IRS inquiries, would provide bank customers with most of
the procedural, if not substantive, rights which accompany fourth
amendment protection. However, the case law suggests several areas
in which futher reform might be appropriate. First, in line with Justice
Douglas's suggestion in the Donaldson case, legislation is needed to
guarantee to the taxpayer the right to be present at the actual meet-
ing between the IRS and the third party when disclosure of bank
records occurs. This change will ensure that the taxpayer has the
opportunity to assert all relevant challenges to disclosure of information
at the actual moment of disclosure. Second, reform similar to that pro-
posed in the Tax Reform Act of 1975 is vitally needed in the statutes
authorizing use of administrative subpoenas by other government agen-
cies. Such reform should be examined at all levels of government in
order to afford citizens procedural protection from broad and unre-
strained government access to genuinely personal documents.
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